14th Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties

Statement of Israel By Mr. Eitan Levon

  •   14th Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on CCW
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    Representative to the Conference on Disarmament 14th Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
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    Mr. President,
     
    At the outset, please allow me to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency and assure you of our delegation's full cooperation and support in the discharge of your duties.
     
    Mr. President,
     
    As a State Party to the CCW, including to the Amended Protocol 2, Israel has undertaken in recent years concrete measures aimed at reducing the potential adverse consequences that may be associated with the irresponsible use of anti-personnel landmines.
     
    In this respect, in 1994 Israel unilaterally declared a moratorium on any export, sales or transfers of all types of anti-personnel mines. The Moratorium was declared in recognition of the grave
    humanitarian consequences associated with proliferation of anti-personnel mines and the need, in this respect, for self-imposed state restraint. Since its initiation, the moratorium has been extended for additional three-year periods, most recently in July 2011 (in force until July 2014).
     
     In addition, the Israeli Parliament enacted in March 2011 the Minefield Clearance Law that sets out a statutory framework for the clearance of minefields not essential to Israel's national security,
    and establishes the Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA). This authority is responsible for planning, coordinating, executing and supervising civilian mine clearance operations, while taking into consideration the International Mine Action Standards endorsed by the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group. Over the past two and half years INMAA has engaged in numerous mine clearance projects, formulated directives for its activities, recruited skilled personnel, issued tenders for companies that execute and supervise the clearance operations, and took measures to enhance public awareness of safety and security. INMAA is enjoying productive cooperation with international organizations such as UNMAS and GICHD.
     
    Mr. President,
     
    Unfortunately, as long as the regional security situation continues to impose a threat on Israel's safety and sovereignty, the need to protect the Israeli borders – including through the use of mines – cannot be discarded. The purpose of the minefields located alongside Israel's borders is to prevent forcible and deliberate incursions and infiltrations into Israel, whether carried out by infantry, armed vehicles or terrorist groups. This vital need was greatly amplified during the past three years, as developments in Syria have significantly contributed to the ongoing instability in the region. Israel continues to view AP mines as an essential and effective tool in deterring and preventing violation of its territorial integrity and threat to its security. Nonetheless, Israel takes its obligations under Amended Protocol 2 very seriously and conducts its activities in strict conformity with these obligations, including those regulating, monitoring, marking, protecting and recording – and thereby striking the balance envisaged by Amended Protocol 2 between military and humanitarian considerations.
     
    Mr. President,
     
    We would like through you to thank the coordinators: Ms Namdi Payne of Australia and Mr. Laurent Masmejean of Switzerland for the report on the issue of IEDs. With respect to information sharing, Israel was pleased in previous years to be able to share with the other States Parties some of the Israeli experience in this area, and to draw upon the valuable knowledge and expertise of two distinguished professors, Joseph Almog and Shmuel Zitrin. We very much hope to continue contributing in this way also in the future. We believe the draft report on IEDs, which is being discussed today, is another important step in further consideration of IEDs, such as the development of best practices or guidelines, aiming to best address different aspects of this security challenge. Such a tool would help to raise awareness to the scope and characteristics of this problem, offer ways to increase the monitoring of explosives which could be used in the preparation of IEDs as well as relevant dual use materials, encourage states to adopt stricter national export controls and limitations of access to these materials, and encourage sharing of information where feasible. We must collectively work towards the prevention of unauthorized transfers, production and the use of IEDs. We trust and hope that this issue, which is vital to many CCW States Parties, could be further advanced in a very concrete way in the coming months and years.Lastly, Israel would like to regret the exploitation of this distinguished forum by some speakers for political purposes.
     
     Thank you, Mr. President.