This consent of a state is also necessary during a non-international armed conflict. In many such conflicts, the area where states operate, and the civilian population living in it, may be under the control of armed groups. Individuals residing within territories governed by armed groups face complex vulnerabilities and specific risks. These risks encompass their proximity to hostilities, which heightens the likelihood of civilian casualties or injuries; limited or nonexistent access to essential infrastructure and services. Practice shows that humanitarian organizations attempting to deliver the relief operations usually seek the consent of the armed group controlling the territory to where they are headed, or at least, to some extent coordinate with it the entry to said territory. It is expected that an armed group will take responsibility for supplying the civilian population under its control and meeting their needs, although in practice, this is rarely observed. (see Geneva Call analysis on humanitarian aid) Unfortunately, there are many challenges in conducting humanitarian operations in a territory under the control of armed groups or in a territory that has proliferation of armed groups activity (see in this respect the Sahel region  and the legal and practical challenges experienced by those attempting to provide humanitarian aid there). There are major legal challenges, stemming from the limitations imposed by the legal frameworks regulating the interaction with these armed groups – mostly in anti-terrorism domestic law and international measures to combat terrorism. Simply put, armed groups are non-State armed actors, designated as illegal terrorist entities by the party to the conflict they are engaged in as well as by third States. These non-State armed actors find themselves in lists aimed to restrict and limit their illicit actions and activities. Consequently, engaging in any form of communication with these groups, even if it is for the purpose of delivering certain products or financial assistance, may be considered prohibited or legitimately be restricted. Moreover, and in the context of an armed conflict, the State party to such conflict with armed groups may wish, for legitimate security concerns, to supervise not only the consignment itself, but also the modalities in which the humanitarian operation will be conducted and the place where it will be delivered to, making sure that the concerned armed group is not receiving the consignment or even managing the entire humanitarian operation. In other words, the legitimate security concerns of States and the anti-terrorism legal framework, both related to States’ behavior and interests, may limit the conduct of humanitarian operation and the access of the civilian population to relief (see, for example, the review of the ICRC on its engagement with armed groups in 2023).

Beyond these legal restrictions, there are practical challenges, that can be learnt from the work and practice of different organizations around the world and the difficulties they have faced in coordinating such relief operations while maintaining the safety of their personnel. Dealing with non-State armed groups in the context of hostilities, raises numerous practical dilemmas (see, for example, review of the crisis in Haiti): with whom should one (be it the State or the humanitarian organization supplying the relief) coordinate the supply? Who is in fact responsible to assure the existing supply, as well as the one received in the context of relief operations, reaches the civilians in need? Can the supply safely reach those in need when it is passing through and dependent on armed groups’ “good-will”? How should the security of the humanitarian aid workers be ensured? (see, for example, the report regarding violence against humanitarian aid workers in armed conflicts involving armed groups including the deliberate targeting and kidnaping). Armed groups often introduce measures that politicize or prohibit humanitarian action and medical missions in the territories they control (see for example, with respect to relief operation in Yemen, where the Houthis have issued an order prohibiting provision of aid outside of their supervision and control, and imposing taxes on said aid). In doing so, they increase the risk of violence and prevent humanitarian professionals from carrying out their fundamental mission: to provide vital assistance and healthcare based solely on the needs of the affected populations (see here).

A major concern, both legally and practically, in these contexts is the diversion of aid by third party providers or its misuse by armed groups (see, for example, Afghanistan and the diversion of aid to the Taliban). Diversion and misuse of aid is defined as taking, stealing, damaging, re-selling or even re-distributing aid, preventing its reach to its original and approved destination (here). The risk of diversion of relief operations and funds by armed groups and terrorist organizations has long been a concern in the humanitarian discourse (see, for example, here  and here(. Some aid organizations adopted specific measure in an attempt to prevent this phenomenon of diversion and misuse. This concern, especially amidst intense combat between the State and the armed groups, affects the provision of aid. Specifically, this may shape the type of supervision and inspection demanded by the State(s) when consenting to the aid and determining the technicalities of the provision of aid to territories controlled by armed groups.

All reflect the basic motivation of creating a set of rules aimed providing tools to address the challenges of fulfilling of the needs of the civilian population, including in the access granted to impartial and independent humanitarian operations, while maintaining proper consideration for the legitimate security concerns of States.