ISA uncovers Hamas recruitment attempts 13 February 2019

ISA uncovers Hamas recruitment attempts

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    The discovery of this recruitment infrastructure highlights once again how relentlessly Hamas takes advantage of Judea and Samaria residents to carry out military activity on behalf of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
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    ​ (Communicated by the ISA)
     
    Recently, the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) discovered attempts by a clandestine unit of Hamas in the Gaza Strip to recruit four residents of Judea and Samaria, as well as one Israeli national from eastern Jerusalem. The recruits were intended to carry out terrorist activity against Israel. In their recruitment, broadcasts of the Al Aqsa TV channel were utilized to send secret messages to Judea and Samaria.
     
    Over the past years, the ISA has detained dozens of youths, including several women, from Judea and Samaria and eastern Jerusalem. They had been having contact with members of the clandestine Hamas unit mentioned above, worked under the latter’s guidance to carry out terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria. As recently as October 2018, the ISA exposed and disrupted yet another instance of the clandestine Hamas unit recruiting residents of Judea and Samaria and eastern Jerusalem to military activity.
     
    As part of the present-day investigation, several operatives from Judea and Samaria were detained and questioned by the ISA, revealing the methods used by Hamas in the Gaza Strip to recruit and handle these operatives:
     
    Qutayba Al Nawaj’a of Yatta, 21, was detained for questioning by the ISA on 21 December 2018. Al Nawaj’a revealed that a year prior, he started communicating via Facebook with a Hamas operative from the Gaza Strip named Mohammad Arbid. At first, Al Nawaj’a believed Arbid to be a journalist, since during riots on the Gaza Strip border, Arbid had photographs taken of him wearing a shirt with “PRESS” written on it.
     
    In November 2018, Arbid introduced Al Nawaj’a to another Hamas operative, who described himself as a member of Hamas’s military wing and offered Al Nawaj’a to carry out terrorist attacks on behalf of Hamas.
     
    The modus operandi
     
    To prove that Al Nawaj’a's interlocutor was indeed a member of Hamas’s military wing, Al Nawaj’a was told to pick a verse from the Quran and watch the Al Aqsa TV channel the next day. During a certain program, the anchor would discuss the Quran verse Al Nawaj’a had chosen. The next day, an Al Aqsa TV anchor indeed discussed the verse Al Nawaj’a had picked, and Al Nawaj’a saw this as proof that he was speaking with a member of Hamas.
     
    Al Nawaj’a was told by the Gaza-based Hamas operatives to carry out a suicide bombing using an explosive belt on a bus in Lod, Israel. Al Nawaj’a was meant to receive the explosive belt mere days after his eventual arrest.
     
    Bahaa Shuja’iya of Deir Jarir, 21, a student of religious studies at Abu Dis University, was the leader of Hamas’s clandestine student cell at the university.
     
    Shuja’iya was released from prison in May 2018 after two years’ imprisonment. He had been convicted of involvement in terrorist activity carried out by a cell recruited by Hamas in the Gaza Strip to carry out shooting attacks and suicide bombings against Israelis.
     
    Shuja’iya was detained for ISA questioning on 16 December 2018. His questioning indicated that several months after his release from prison, Shuja’iya was contacted by a Gaza-based Hamas operative via Facebook. The Gazan operative offered Shuja’iya to participate in military activity, adding that people from the Al Aqsa channel proposed that Shuja’iya operate on behalf of Hamas.
     
    The Gazan operative communicating with Shuja’iya was Moussa Alayan of Jabalya, 24, a Hamas member who identified as a journalist on social media.
     
    Ahmad Abu Aysha of Nablus, 23, was detained for ISA questioning on 26 December 2018. Abu Aysha’s questioning indicated that he was approached by members of Hamas in the Gaza Strip with the aim of advancing military activity. He also received messages via the Al Aqsa TV channel using an MO similar to that described above.
     
    Abu Aysha's questioning showed that after being approached by the Gazan operatives, he recruited Hamas operative Said Issa of Nablus, 24, to carry out a stabbing attack within Israel. This plan was inspired by the Itamar attack (2011), in which five members of the Fogel family were killed.
     
    Alaa Sharawna, 26, originally from Silwan, resided in eastern Jerusalem and possessed an Israeli ID card. Sharawna was detained for ISA questioning on 8 January 2019. Sharawna’s questioning indicated that he had been recruited by members of the military wing of Hamas in the Gaza Strip to establish a military cell.
     
    According to Sharawna's questioning, members of Hamas’s military wing – Mohammad Arbid, Mohammad Aqel, and Mohammad Abu Kweik – gave him tasks, such as filming points of interest in Jerusalem. They had also dispatched a courier from the Gaza Strip to Sharawna.
     
    Use of the Al Aqsa TV channel to broadcast messages for terror operatives
     
    The ISA and IDF are aware that operatives of Hamas’s military wing use Al Aqsa TV for terrorist purposes. This knowledge was a key factor in the decision to launch an air strike against the channel’s studios in the Gaza Strip on 12 November 2018.
     
    By watching the program, the recruit received a confirmation of the Gaza-based operative’s claims.
     
    Some of the anchors who aided Hamas’s military wing in broadcasting messages:
     
    Islam Bader of Jabalya, 30, a Hamas operative and well-known Al Aqsa TV anchor.
     
    Rajai Hams of Gaza City, 32, a Hamas operative and well-known Al Aqsa TV anchor.
     
    A senior ISA official commented on the case: “This activity by Hamas's military wing is yet another one in the series of attempts by Hamas in the Gaza Strip to carry out terrorist attacks by recruiting operatives in Judea and Samaria and eastern Jerusalem. All these have been disrupted by the ISA in recent years, leading to the arrests of dozens of young operatives in Judea and Samaria and Jerusalem.
     
    Hamas’s attempts to initiate this activity have failed again and again. Still, they shed light on the strategy chosen by Hamas to try to destabilize the situation in Judea and Samaria at any cost.
     
    Ongoing activity by the clandestine terrorist infrastructure run by senior operatives of Hamas in the Gaza Strip is a dangerous destabilizing factor that poses a significant and immediate threat to the situation in the region. Hamas operatives are particularly determined to recruit to military activity operatives from East Jerusalem with Israeli IDs, who have ready access to Israel.
     
    The discovery of this infrastructure highlights once again how relentlessly Hamas takes advantage of Judea and Samaria residents to carry out military activity on behalf of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.