Israel's Policy on Selective Conscientious Objection
STATE OF ISRAEL
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Human Rights and International Relations Department
May 25, 1993
With regard to measures taken against Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
soldiers who refuse to serve in specific locations (selective
conscientious objectors), the following is the legal and factual
background on the subject of Israel's policy on selective conscientious
objection.
1. A soldier may seek an exemption from service or a deferment for
special reasons under Article 36 et. seq. of the Defense Service Law
(Consolidated Version) (1959) as amended. Special reasons in this
instance include educational requirements, economic hardship and
extenuating family circumstances. In light of the enormous armies of
the Arab States at war with Israel, which can mobilize over five
million soldiers as opposed to the considerably smaller IDF, it is
understandable that the needs of the IDF must take priority over the
personal preferences of its soldiers.
2. The IDF is non-political. Soldiers are not permitted to engage in
partisan politics while in uniform. As citizens of a democracy,
however, soldiers are permitted to be members of political parties and
to advocate change in government policies. Soldiers of the IDF, just as
all Israeli citizens, are encouraged to vote in national elections. By
voting and exercising their individual right to party membership,
soldiers are able to participate in the democratic process with the
intention of achieving change. However, each individual must abide by
policies of the democratically elected government with which he might
disagree.
A soldier cannot be allowed to dictate which government policies he
will respect nor where and under what circumstances he will serve.
Israel does not recognize a right to "selective" objection, i.e.,
unwillingness to serve in specific places or capacities. The
recognition of such a "right" runs contrary to basic conceptions of
military order and discipline. Under any democracy's military law,
refusal to comply with a military order constitutes grounds for
criminal prosecution or disciplinary action. No army could function
without the ultimate authority to order soldiers to serve in any
location according to military necessity.
In two decisions, the Supreme Court of Israel upheld the principle that
soldiers of the IDF must serve where they are posted: that of Elgazi v.
The Minister of Defense and Shine v. The Minister of Defense. In the
Elgazi decision, the Court stated, inter alia, "No military system can
reconcile itself with the existence of a principle whereby soldiers can
dictate to it where they will serve, whether for economic or social
reasons, or for reasons of conscience." (HCJ 470/80) In the decision,
the Court stated that "to accept this phenomenon not only contradicts
express legislation under which a soldier must serve "when and where"
so commanded (Sec. 19(a) of the Defense Service Law), but further
damages the preparedness, training and combat-readiness of the IDF and
the fulfillment of its missions, and, no less seriously, damages the
morale of his brothers-in-arms, who put their own lives in danger,
while their comrades are 'exempted'...".
3. Ultimately, an IDF soldier's refusal to serve in a specific location
or to perform specific duties is borne of particular political
convictions and is not an absolute objection to participation in the
army. Those soldiers who refuse to serve in the administered areas are
cognizant of the legal consequences for selective objection to military
service.
Most democracies do not exempt selective conscientious objectors from
army service. For example, In the case of Gilette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437 (1971), the United States Supreme Court ruled as follows:
no person shall be subject to service in the armed forces who,
by reason of religion, training and belief, is conscientiously
opposed to participating in war of any form... [conscientious
objection] is intended to exempt persons who oppose
participating in all wars ... persons who solely object to
participation in a particular war are not within the purview
of the exemption even though the objection may have such roots
in a claimant's conscience and personality that it is
'religious' in character. [Emphasis added.]
The disciplinary measures which Israel takes against selective
objectors are considerably more lenient than those taken by the United
States and other Western democracies. For example, during the period
when the Gilette case was heard, the United States was engaged in the
Vietnam war. United States soldiers who refused to participate in the
war were often punished by an initial prison sentence of five years
[see e.g., U.S. v. Fallon, 407 F. 2d 621, cert, den. 395 U.S. 908
(1969)]. More recently, during the Gulf War, members of the U.S. armed
forces were sentenced to terms from 4 to 30 months imprisonment for
refusing to accompany their units to Saudi Arabia. By contrast, Israel,
which faces a much more imminent security threat and which must place a
higher value on the preparedness of each individual soldier in its
comparatively small army, disciplines selective objectors with
relatively light sentences. Single sentences for selective objectors
rarely exceed one month.
We appreciate the opportunity to respond to your inquiry directly and
hope we have been able to clarify Israel's position and considerations
in this complex matter.